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 The Trickle-Down Effect of Psycho-Social Constructs and Knowledge Deficiencies as 
Organizational Barriers to Cost Performance on Highway Projects 
Abstract 
 
Purpose  
The study aims to proffers a theoretical narrative explaining the poor financial performance 
of public highway agencies in Nigeria. This study critically spotlights seminal works in the 
literature offering theoretical narratives on the poor financial performance of public 
infrastructure projects, as to discuss whether they adequately capture the relationship between 
the psychological factors, project governance/leadership issues, ands well as knowledge/skill 
deficiencies related to the cost performance of infrastructure projects in the developing world. 
The evaluation reveals the predominant contextual exclusivity of these theoretical narratives 
to the developed world, which tend to under-representis mostly not reflective developing 
countries, such as those on the African continent.  
 
Design/methodology/approach  
Using athe case study research strategy, longitudinal dDocumentary/aArchival data for 61 
highway projects were analyzedas carried. Sixteen16 interviews were also conducted with 
highway officials from the three highway agencies responsible for the execution of the 
projects. A two2-stage deductive-inductive thematic analysis of the collated data wais carried 
out to identify barriers to the financial management of public highway projects, the result of 
which is cognitively mapped out. 
 
Findings 
The study showcases empirical insight on cost overruns experienced in Nigerian public 
projects, due toas the trickle-down effect of the human and organizational environment, as 
well as due to workers’ knowledge/skill deficiencies.  
 
Research limitations/implications  
The developed theory is contextual to Nigeria, as such there is scope for testing its 
generalisability to other developing nations. 
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Originality/value 
The in-depth trajectory provided, uncovers an intricate web of technical and psycho-social, 
organizational and institutional issues, which have not been identified and explained by 
previous theoretical narratives. 
 
 
Key Words: Psycho-social Constructs; Cost Growth; Developing country; Public 
Infrastructure projects 
 
 
Introduction 
Traditional schools of thought insist the root sources of poor financial performance in 
infrastructure projects, lie principally within the domains of technical issues and poor project 
shaping at the front-end. However, an emerging body of research, have begun to uncover 
organizational, governance and leadership issues, which can trigger psycho-social 
dysfunctionalities in infrastructure projects, leading to cost overruns in public projects. This 
is considering the dynamics in public infrastructure projects, which requires managing 
uncertainty with limitedsmall time, and cost buffers as well as handling a lot of foreseen and 
unforeseen uncertainties in a complex environment, with various stakeholders with different 
expectations and demands. (Johansson, 2015).  
Acknowledging human factors and professional limitations, as well as the unbalanced 
pressures that foil good engineering practicse, thus constitute an emerging strand in the 
research domain of the cost performance of public infrastructure projects. A limited number 
of studies in the literature have explored the ‘trickle-down effect of the human and 
governance factors on the financial performance of public projects. The literature, however 
evidences that although cost overruns, present a malignant tumour in public construction 
projects executed in both the developed and developing world, they areit is relatively higher 
in the developing world, particularly on the African continent (Transportation and Road 
Research Laboratory, 1998; AICD, 2008). Thise study evaluates the extant literature offering 
theoretical narratives on psychological, project governance and leadership issues in public 
projects, along with relationship of knowledge/ skill deficiencies to cost performance, as to 
whether they are adequate to explain the poor cost performance of public projects in the 
developing world. In view of a skills gap, as well as the socio-cultural differences, between 
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the developed and the developing world, the study aims to proffers a theoretical narrative 
explaining the poor financial performance of public highway agencies in Nigeria. 
 
 
  
 
Cost Overrun in Public Infrastructure Projects 
A large body of research has focused on cost overruns (Hall 1980; Wachs, 1987; Morris 
1990; Mansfield et al.,1994; Baccarani, 2004; Bordat et al., 2004; Odeck, 2004; Kaliba et 
al.,; 2008; Akoa, 2011; Ubani, 2015) andhas collectively espoused a range of explanations, as 
to why public iInfrastructure projects appear predisposed to cost overrun.  The first 
proposition espouses cost overrun are simply a consequence of technical errors made by the 
project team.   Cantarelli et al (2010) and later Allahahium and Liu (2012) suggest cost 
overruns are a collective term for a diverse range of technical failings including inter alia: 
inaccurate estimates, lack of awareness of geotechnical factors and other technical omissions 
on behalf of the project team that ultimately translate into post-contract change and ultimately 
increased expenditure.  
 
Other, more sophisticated explanations offered in the literature relate to theoretical, politico-
economic and psychological aspectsexplanations of overrun underpinned by the Nobel 
winning work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who explained exploring the impact of 
professional judgment during decision making. Similarly,alongside the pioneering work of 
Wachs (1989) exploreding conflicting aspects of professional decision making, whereby 
planners discard contradictory scientific evidence in the hope of making a decisions in high 
levels of uncertainty that please their employer or clients.  These theories are rooted in the 
cognitive dynamics of estimation, planning, decision and policy making by people in 
institutional settings under high levels of uncertainty, and how this leads to the various 
successes and failures of projects (Cantarelli et al., 2010). Consequently, these theories have 
formed the building blocks for the theoretical narratives and descriptive trajectories that 
shape theoretical discourse in cost overrun literature.   
 
Psychological explanations for cost overrun 
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Focused primarily on disproving the technical failings argument that advocates knowledge 
and skills deficiencies lie at the route of financial overrun,. Flyvbjerg et al (2002) are of the 
opinion that cost overrun results from failures in professionalism and ethical practice within 
the project team. Theyus Flyvberg contends, “optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation 
are . . . deception, but where the latter is intentional, the first is not, as optimism bias is self-
deception” (Flyvbjerg, 2008:3).  This form of self-deception, Wachs (1987) and Flyvbjerg et 
al (2002) insinuate, emanates from unethical practice, deception, delusion and the attitude of 
public officials.   These traits combine to create an organisational culture whereby financial 
reports are designed to fit the financial constraints of the client (Wachs, 1987, Flyvbjerg et al, 
2002).   
 
Flyvbjerg et al (2002) and later Flyvbjerg (2008) challenged consistent underestimation 
within public infrastructure projects, especially those forming part of larger programmes of 
work, where continuous improvements in estimating accuracy would be expected. Flyvbjerg 
et al’s (2002) analysis of 254 projects led them to conclude consistent underestimation of cost 
was not influenced by project duration, type or location.  This they advocate suggests cost 
overrun must be the consequence of premeditated acts of deception rather than factors such as 
inter alia errors, knowledge and skill deficiencies or unforeseen geologic risk. Reinforcing 
this position, Flyvbjerg et al (2002) contendt that any combination of technical failings would 
be eliminated by either experiential learning; with failures and knowledge deficiencies 
corrected in future project planning (Lowe and Skitmore, 2007) or enhanced risk analysis 
whereby cost overruns would be significantly reduced or eradicated. In consequence, cost 
overruns could only be attributed to blatant lies by the project team and government officials 
who, it was suggested, strategically misrepresented financial data in their project proposals to 
gain approval. As a result, only the most unfit projects were, by implication approved, 
resulting in the significant cost overruns observed by in the wider literature (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2004). 
Cantarelli et al (2010) advocate the problems of cost overrun are rooted in the project team’s 
inadequate planning that in-turnin turn leads to sub-optimal decisions made under both 
uncertainty and political pressure, a behavioural form of lock- in. Defined by Cantarelli et al 
(2010:793) as “a form of psychological coping associated with the inability to withdraw from 
obligations made in the decision-making process”. In the case of major infrastructure 
projects, lock-in is evident within the project team when they are placed under extreme 
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political pressure from the public sectorpublic-sector client to commence work as quickly as 
possible and to then evidence continuous progress.  Under this situation, the client has in -
effect set the pace for path dependency that means progress is demanded on whatever option 
the project team feel is appropriate. Aat this stage in the project’s evolution, irrespective of 
whether a more optimal alternative is subsequently identified that could possibly respond to 
identified risk more appropriately avoiding costly change later but also delaying the 
completion of the project (Cantarelli et al. 2010).  As a result, the project team are forced to 
adopt sub-optimal decisions (Woerdman, 2004).   
Cantarelli et al’s (2010) research exploring two major European infrastructure projects 
reveals, in this situation, project actors will experience either conscious or unconscious lock-
in.  In the former, project proponents will become trapped in their decisions, as there are no 
viable alternatives, and therefore irreversibly committed to seeing the project through to 
completion, even with evidence of escalating cost.  Whilst those experiencing unconscious 
lock-in will seek to deliberately justify earlier project approval decisions, without attempting 
to explore the option of reversing that decision, in the face of escalating cost. Whilst 
Cantarelli’s work builds the case for a psychologically orientated theoretical framework for 
cost-overrun, it also dismisses Flyvbjerg et al’s (2002) assertions that technical explanations 
are the least likely cause of cost overrun, as Cantarelli advocates lock-in can span the four 
classically identified causes of cost overrun including technical explanations. 
Project and Organisational Governance as a Trigger of Cost Overruns 
In the main, cost overrun literature identifies four fundamental silos when explaining the 
causes of cost overrun: political, economic, psychological and technical into which every 
study is intrinsically categorised.  However, a developing body of work (Morris, 1990, Love 
et al, 2012, Gil and Lundriganm, 2012; 2013) identifies a fifth explanation for cost overrun 
linked to failings in governance and leadership, both within the project team and periphery 
stakeholder organisations.   
 
Morris (1990), one of the few researchers to explore overrun in developing rather than 
developed nations, first put forward the governance argument in ahis seminal work in the 
early 1990s.  Noting the unusually very high cost (92%) and time (192%) overruns in public 
sector projects in India, Morris observed that a vicious cycle of events outside the control of 
the project team accounted for the majority of project cost overruns in publicly funded 
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infrastructure projects. This cycle of events Morris noted starts with the financial model 
applied by the Indian government, which adopts short funding for all public-sector 
infrastructure projects, except the ones accorded the highest priority.  Analysis of the 
sectorial pattern of capital outlay in annual budgets for different sectors revealed the Indian 
Government spread financial resources thinly across multiple projects.  Resulting in funds, 
adequate for the full and timely completion of three or potentially four projects, to be spread-
out to accommodate six or seven projects.  Consequently, completion times for committed 
projects would stretch beyond anticipated completion dates, a period over which inflation 
would creep in. Even with the huge backlog of uncompleted projects, further projects would 
still be initiated.   However, Morris (1990) concedes that ineffective project teams had a role 
in exacerbating these governance failings.  Detailed analysis of 94% of available project 
reports revealed inadequate preparation, planning and implementation, with estimates 
developed based on minimal project information, no appraisal of potential risk and with a 
complete disregard for preliminary analysis. Despite revelations about the inadequacy of the 
project team, Morris’ arguments about project governance nonetheless retained credibility. 
 
 
Despite revelations about the inadequacy of the project team, Morris’ arguments about 
project governance nonetheless retained credibility. Albeit, researchers are theorising that 
failings in governance and leadership influencing cost overrun cann t be seen as single point 
events, but they represent a continuous evolution of failure, that culminates in cost overrun 
and delay (Love et al, 2012, Gil and Lundrigan 2012, Lundrigan and Gil 2013).   Adapting an 
overall process-oriented framework, Gil and Lundriganm (2012) conceptualised a ‘relay 
race’ model for understanding cost growth, founded in the dynamics of project governance, 
amidst conflicting stakeholder interest and competitive strive for leadership in mega projects, 
which fosters design changes. This was explained as a characteristic of three UK based mega 
projects (Cross Rail, 2012 Olympic Games, and Heathrow T2) analysed, where ‘the client is 
a multi-headed organization because the different clients may feel entitled to be in control’ 
(Gil and Lundriganm 2012:4).  Gil and Lundriganm’s (2012) comprehensive cross-case 
analysis of three UK based mega projects, Cross Rail, 2012 Olympic Games and Heathrow 
T2 once again reveals the importance of governance, and the impacts of leadership on 
financial control. Qualitative data collected from each project team revealed a series of relay 
based leadership processes within each mega project, where the transitory phases of each 
project representedphases represented a stage, in the relay culminating in a baton handover,, 
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however, for the mega project, the baton became an analogy for project leadership, which 
transferred between key stakeholders. Typically, decision makers with lower levels of 
technical competence, invariably determine changes to the scope of projects and approve 
budget outlays, while under the managerial jurisdiction of the public agency, contractors 
often re-negotiate the initially approved outlay, in the light of their perception of risks 
inherent in the project, as well as new information which may have emerged over the period 
of gestation. As such over this period of multiple re-negotiations and design evolution, with 
differences in skills and competence of the race team (leaders), inconsistencies are generated, 
posing a critical managerial challenge which culminate in significant cost growth over the 
project phases. 
 
 
Adapting this overall process oriented relay framework, Gil and Lundriganm (2012) 
conceptualised a ‘relay race’ model for understanding cost growth, founded in the dynamics 
of project governance, amidst conflicting stakeholder interest and competitive strive for 
leadership in mega projects, which fosters design changes. This was explained as a 
characteristic of mega projects, where ‘the client is a multi-headed organization because the 
different clients may feel entitled to be in control’ (Gil and Lundriganm 2012:4).  As such 
differences in skills and competence of the race team (leaders) and the inconsistencies 
generated posed a critical managerial challenge culminating in cost overruns, over the project 
phases. 
 
The concept of the relay race is such that at the initial inception phase of a project, the 
proposal tendered by a scheme promoter, may have been initially rejected, but later gains 
acceptance and momentum within a sponsoring public agency (the principal). The idea now 
must be developed, and presented to decision makers, who are conceptualised as having 
limited in-house technical knowledge, for approval. This then implies that specialists are 
commissioned to develop a compelling case for the proposal to be approved. Aside from this 
technical requirement, the views of various stakeholders, future financial sponsors, and the 
public, has to be incorporated, to facilitate the lobbying process. Thus, shifting the emphasis 
away from the project’s technical challenges.   Accordingly, the project significantly evolves 
in design and scope as trade-offs are agreed and simultaneous negotiations necessary to gain 
political will impact on the project’s evolution. This thus sets the stage for elasticity in the 
project cost profile, as decision makers with lower levels of technical competence, invariably 
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determine changes to the scope of projects and approve budget outlays, while under the 
managerial jurisdiction of the public agency, contractors often re-negotiate the initially 
approved outlay, in the light of their perception of risks inherent in the project, as well as new 
information which may have emerged over the period of gestation. Gil and Lundriganm 
(2012) thus concluded that over this period of multiple re-negotiations and design evolution, 
projects experience significant cost growth, with the three projects appraised experiencing 
strikingly similar relay race narratives, that in turn accounted for the significant disparity 
between their initial budget and the final account. 
 
Lundriganm and Gil’s (2013) later work based on the same set of projects, further defined 
megaprojects as hybrid forms of meta-organization, with cost overruns intricately dependent 
on its hierarchical technical decision making core, enveloped in a permeable membrane, 
which allows for osmotic diffusion from peripheral actors to exert influence over designing 
and building activities. They Lundriganm and Gil (2013: 1), thus described public agencies as 
open systems, where by the organisations must adapt and align their product (projects) to the 
environment (stakeholders and political) they are designing for, and which they cannot 
control.  Adopting this position, and using the same three projects (2012 Olympics, Crossrail 
and Heathrow T2) Lundriganm and Gil Cconceptualised two distinct developmental 
pathways (Parading and The Hard Way) for the delivery of any mega project,.  Whilst these 
pathways make mega projects distinctive, Lundriganm and Gil assert they also account for 
observed cost overruns, whereby: . Longitudinal analysis of the three case study projects 
revealed that whilst  
 Tthe 2012 Olympics adopted the parading route adopted by the 2012 Olympics.  iIn 
which lobbying and informal pledges between the core (technical actors) and the 
periphery (stakeholders), led to speedy approval, but.  However, this strategy also 
resulted in significantly renegotiated designs and escalating financial commitments.  
 
 The Hard Way, a far more structured and regimented process, that requires the project 
team to stick strictly to initial technical proposals, was adopted by the other two 
projects,. Yet this also resulted in similar cost growth,.  due to lengthier gestation 
periods. 
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This raisesing important questions about the impact of the developmental pathway on cost 
overrun.  However, this is not resolved in the research, as Lundriganm and Gil fail to provide 
evidence of causation within their hypothesis testing. 
 
Whilst leadership and management failings can have an influence of cost overrun, Love et al. 
(2012), argue that often a mixture of leadership and governance failings are reinforced by 
strategic actions, driven by the free-market commercialised model of consultancy practice.  
Working in Australia, Love et al. (2012) carried out a qualitative case study to explain cost 
overruns, Uusing a narrative, specific to the design of three publicly financed social 
infrastructure projects,.  On all projects Love et al observed that the design consultants would 
often proceed with highly optimistic intent of producing error-free design documentation.  
However, the initial design revisions are subject to frequent revision as project stakeholders 
exert influence on the proposals and the project is refined and amended. Whilst this is 
standard practice, Love et al. (2012) observed that the management of the practice demanded 
that design quality was reconciled against commercial return.  Consequently, practice 
managers adopt circumstantial market-driven strategies that define the quality of consultancy 
service offered relative to fees, to stay afloat in the competitive environment. Thus, design 
quality offered by practice would be conceptualized as a function of how fees are negotiated, 
with competitively procured services, yielding restricted consultancy services, in the face of 
the disproportionate and impracticable demands often imposed by the public sector.   
This latent condition, termed ‘organisational and circumstantial Pathogens’, combined with 
the limited time frame available during the initial conceptual phases, activates trade-offs 
during the performance of tasks: design shortcuts against fee maximization, thereby setting 
off an additive chain of concomitant errors which creates significant ‘error traps’. Such 
significant errors when discovered latter during the construction phase, which may 
necessitate rework and variations, with the resultant resolution of conflicts and contractual 
disputes, leading to cost overruns. Pathogens as represented in the framework thus represent 
“the latent conditions that lay dormant within a system until an error comes to light” (Love 
et al., 2012:3).  Love et al (2012) concluded that Ssuch pathogens may thus be considered 
part and parcel of the everyday functioning in an organization, which are 
consideredpathogens, considered normal practice but which , because they have been in 
existence over a considerable period of time. But in actuality, such practices negate or 
significantly deviate from best practice,. are the primary triggers which foster a dysfunctional 
contractual climate on projects, leading to cost overruns. Love et al.’s framework thus maps 
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out the practices within design organizations that constitute the latent issues, which combine 
with errors to result in active failures. Love et al. (2012: 3) identified several triggers 
(pathogens) for design error including:  
 
“The recycling of design details, specifications, and other contract documentation to reduce 
time and save money, without giving due consideration to the project’s bespoke nature”  
 
Love et al. (2012:3) thus concluded that unintentional design errors in the original contract 
documentation prepared by consultants, termed ‘Latent organisational and circumstantial 
Pathogens’, are the primary trigger which fosters a dysfunctional contractual climate on 
projects leading to cost overruns.  
 
Following the explanations reviewed, an easily identifiable loophole in the generalisability of 
the conclusions reached by four out of the five seminal works reviewed, namely they are 
based on case studies appraisals of projects executed within developed nations. Flyvbjerg et 
al.’s (2002) conclusions were drawn based on sample data for highway projects mainly in 
developed nations, located in the Northern Hemisphere., with the Mmajority of the projects 
were selected from Europe and North America, with little focus on developing nations such 
as those on the African continent. Cantarelli et al. (2010) theory was contextualized for high 
speed rail projects in the Netherlands, Love et al’s analogy related to latent pathogens was 
contextualized based on a limited sample of social infrastructure projects in Australia, whilst 
Gil and Lundrigan (2012) and Lundrigan and Gil (2013) theories were drawn from the 
longitudinal study of three mega projects in the UK. This limits their generalisability to the 
distinctive settings of highway development in developing countries, a fundamental argument 
further posed by the researcher: That the contextual settings of highway project delivery, in 
the developed and developing world, are very different, and that existing theories on cost 
overruns do not adequately relay the intrinsic technical limitations of the developing world. 
This, is with the exception of the study by Morris (1990).  
 
Despite a comprehensive literature search by the researchers, this older study by Morris 
(1990), carried out 26 years ago, is the only theoretical narrative contextualised in a 
developing country., Hhowever, whilst infrastructure development in developed nations has 
mostly reached its peak, in developing countries, it is still in its formative stages (TRL, 1978; 
Millard, 1993).  Consequently, the 75 years span of project data typically collated by 
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Flyvbjerg and co-authors based on which findings were made, is not practically tenable for 
most developing nations on the African continent. Nigeria, for instance is a country whose 
documented history of road infrastructure development, dates back less than 57 years. The 
low-level of technical know-how by developing nations, is noted by the researchers, as 
contextualized by Morris (1990). Morris (1990) argued the macro-economic concept tagged a 
‘“vicious cycle of delays and short-funding’” by government agencies, amidst low levels of 
technical capacity and highly bureaucratic styles of functioning, mostly explained cost 
overruns in Indian public projects. However, Morris (1990) study is specifically 
contextualised to explain cost overruns for Indian public sector projects, as such cannot be 
directly applicable to other developing nations. As a result, this study resolved to appraise the 
extent and potential triggers of cost overruns in Nigerian infrastructure projects to enhance 
the literature related to cost overruns for infrastructure projects in developing nations, that has 
thus far been limited to the work of Morris (1990). 
 
The Nigerian Context: Geography and Highway Project Cost Performance  
Nigeria is a country of physical contrast, owing mainly to the vastness of its landmass. The 
delineation of physical regions defining the geographic belts of Nigeria based on climatic 
conditions that in turn determines vegetation and soils.  The highest lands are along the north-
eastern border of the country, which rise to a maximum of 240m above sea level, and areis 
characterized by a broad expanse of level sandy plains, interspersed by rocky outcrops.  The 
relief declines steadily from the Northern highlands southwards to the coastal lowlands at the 
Niger Delta, of less than 80m above sea level, stretching inland from the coast for over 250 
meters.   
 
The Niger Delta region is an archetypal tropical wetland, crisscrossed by a myriad of streams, 
rivers and inland water channels. Its terrain consists of varying geological formations, with a 
significant proportion consisting of difficult expansive clayey sub-soils (Teme, 2002).  Due to 
this peculiar geologic configuration, several authors (Oguara, 2002; Teme, 2002; Youdoewei, 
2013; Ngerebara et al., 2014) have emphasizsed the need to manage and analyze 
uncertainties associated with the difficult geology to curb cost escalation. This is against the 
backdrop of cost overruns of extreme proportions, significantly higher than in other parts of 
Nigeria. With most, if not all, completed highway projects recording exceedingly high cost 
overrun figures, a concern currently being investigated by the Nigerian Senate.  
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. 
 
Research Strategy 
Due to the extreme cost escalation associated with highway delivery in the Niger Delta, the 
study purposively sampleds the region.  In view of the peculiar geologic setting of the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria, the initial case study narrative wais framed within the lenses of the 
geotechnical difficulties, experienced by public highway agencies in the delivery of highway 
infrastructure, which may trigger cost overruns, juxtaposed against the backdrop of the 
setting of Nigeria as a developing nation. Therefore, although other triggers to cost overruns 
are acknowledged as present in highway projects, the study primarily sets off using a 
geotechnical trajectory, specific to the wetland geologic setting of the region, to explain cost 
overrun in the Niger Delta.  
 
As previous studies examining cost overrun in both developed and developing nations 
(Morris 1990, Flyvbjerg et al 2002, Flyvbjerg 2008, Cantarelli et al 2010, Love et al, 2012, 
Gil and Lundrigan 2012, Lundrigan and Gil 2013) made clear, the research methodology 
adopted needed to be one in which the context was paramount. The narrative provided in this 
study is thus contextualised in the real-life institutional and organisational setting of highway 
agencies responsible for commissioning highway projects in the region, using the case study 
research strategy (Fellows and Liu, 2008;. Yin (2014:24))..  
 
 As the Literature related to case study research espouses, the adoption of multiple case 
designs, is assertied to be arguably more robust than single case studies, as they allow 
generalisations to be strengthened and broadened within the research design (Stake, 2005; 
Proverbs and Gameson, 2008; Yin, 2014).  It was therefore resolved to adopt an embedded 
multiple case design using a literal replication logic, whereby the cases are designed to 
corroborate each other (Yin, 2014).  Each case study focused on one of the three highway 
agencies operating in the Niger Delta.    
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data wereas collected bBased on longitudinal dDocumentary/aArchival analysis of 61 
highway projects triangulated with 16 interviews conducted with professionals within the 
three highway agencies responsible for their execution. In the conduct of the interviews, 
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measures of validity and reliability posited by Yin (2014) were further ensured, to establish 
the credibility of the study’s contribution to knowledge, that is: 
 
 Preparation of ethical consent and introduction letters as part of case study protocol; 
 Piloting of draft interview questions; 
 Use of multiple key informants with multi-disciplinary perspectives. 
 
A semi-structured interview format was used to draft the questions in the interview guide 
used, based on its flexibility. As such, additional questions not originally part of the interview 
protocol were introduced to probe unanticipated issues that occurred during the interview, 
and which the researcher considered crucial to the study.  As Figure 1 shows, that the unit of 
analysis, towards which all data collection was targeted, was the ‘geotechnical practicses of 
highway agencies in the geologic setting of the Niger Delta’.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
To investigate the practicses of three highway agencies, within their distinct organisational 
settings a two2-stage deductive-inductive thematic analysis, was used to analyse both the 
documentary records and the primary interview data. As King (2004:21) espouses, when 
using thematic analysis:  
 
“… the researcher produces a list of codes (‘template’) representing themes which 
will usually be defined a priori, but are modified and added to as the researcher reads 
and interprets the texts. The template is organized in a way which represents the 
relationships between themes, as defined by the researcher”.  
 
Reflexivity during the coding process, offered the added advantage of flexibility, afforded by 
the use of both deductive and inductive coding. Inductive analysis was thus carried out as the 
second phase of the analysis, following the deductive phase. The inductive phase, thus 
identified emergent themes which act to impact on the cost performance of highway projects. 
Using the NVivo-10 software, the following logical steps outlined in Table 1 were used in the 
deductive/inductive analysis of the interviews. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
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The use of NVvivo allows the researcher to arrange the data to be arranged using a 
hierarchical tree structure (King 2008).  The central phenomenon (cost overrun) formed the 
roots of the tree from which sub-categories or nodes were generated.  
 
 
Results 
Following a geotechnical narrative applicable to highway projects, an array of factors was 
identified from the deductive analysis of the interview data, as contributing to the unusually 
high level of cost overruns evidenced in the sample of 61 highway projects. The deductive 
analysis identified the geotechnical practicses of the highway organisations, which constitute 
the latent pathogens, that mostly lie dormant and have gone undetected, as they form part of 
the everyday practices of the highway organisations: 
 The iInconsistency in the phase configuration of highway project development in the 
Niger Delta; 
 The lLack of adequate geotechnical evaluation for the planning of highway projects; 
 The lLack of in-house geotechnical presence in some of the highway agencies, 
throughout the phases of highway development;  
 The uUse of non-differentiated costing platforms in budgetary provision for proposed 
highway projects at the preliminary phases of highway development; 
 The nNon-adherence of highway designs to the appropriate engineering sections, as 
recommended by the nationally adopted highway design standard in Nigeria, the 
TRRL (1993), despite the heterogeneous sub-soil profile of the Niger Delta region; 
 The pPredominant lack of preparation of adequate and comprehensive designs for 
community highway projects;  
 The lLack of adequate geotechnical risk containment measures, in contracts awarded 
by the highway agencies, necessary to lessen the magnitude of geotechnical risk borne 
by contractors in bidding for highway contracts; and 
 The pPrimarily subjectively and politically driven mode of contractor selection during 
the award of highway contracts, which is not based on any form of geotechnical 
criteria requisite to ensure efficiency of project execution. 
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All of these technical shortcomings, latent in the everyday practices of the highway agencies, 
revolve around inadequate management of the high level of geotechnical risks associated 
with ground conditions in the Niger Delta. These latent pathogens occur, however, amidst the 
wide array of pPsycho-socio-cultural issues concomitantly identified from further inductive 
analysis as contextual to highway delivery in the Niger Delta (Table 2). 
Insert Table 2 here 
These underlying contextual drivers, actively facilitate geotechnical factors and trigger a 
‘vicious cycle of delays and short funding’, which Morris (1990) conceptualises as leading to 
cost overruns in public projects in the developing world. Table 3 is a coded clustering of the 
induced themes based on the researchers’ conceptualisation, as barriers to adequate 
Ggeotechnical Input (GI) in therisk management of risks in the highway projects, which also 
serves as a key to the cognitive mapping, presented in Figure 23. 
 
Insert Table 23Here 
 
As conceptualised in Table 3:,  
 Psychological Traps, refer to those subconscious attitudes of client’s and contractors, 
largely defined by their level of enlightenment on the financial implications of 
geotechnical risks containment as well as social conditioning, which may effectively 
serve as mental traps, and impede the realisation of the evident ‘Value for Money’ 
benefits of adequate geotechnical risk management in highway projects. Typically, as 
noted from the interview responses, these include: level of ‘Risk Perception (RP), 
relating to the lack of knowledge and understanding of the need for geo-risk 
management.  
 
 Pressure Emitters refer to those external elements/stakeholders in the institutional set 
up of highway agencies, which radiate compressive pressure on professional 
obligations, thereby constricting the potentials for ensuring technical requirements of 
geotechnical best practice. Typically, in the context of the Niger Delta, these include 
Political Pressures (PP), Community Pressures (CP), and all other forms of unethical 
pPressures, such as from contractors.  
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 Organisational Catalysts are the adverse non-project specific ‘Organisations’ and 
‘people’ related variables in the highway agencies which represent the deficient 
institutional arrangements within the highway agencies, such as issues of 
‘Mismatched Qualifications and Roles (MQR), which can serve to foster 
mismanagement of geotechnical risks.  
 
 Skills Gap refer to the individual specific knowledge deficiencies of professionals 
working on highway projects, such as low level of technical competence in design, 
and low level of enlightenment about issues related to the financial risk management 
of geotechnical issues in highway projects, which can be overcome by adequate 
training and enlightenment.  
  
 
 Dichotomies, are those inequalities and preferential practices of highway agencies, 
which result in uneven management of risks in projects, such as the negligence of 
smaller community projects located in remote areas in favour of major ones, in the 
face of funding shortfalls.  
 
 Unethical Facilitators represent those subtle unprofessional and unethical practices of 
the key actors in highway projects, primarily geared towards personal gains, such as 
those by contractors, consultants and highway officials, as well as other forms of 
organisational and institutional irregularities in the procurement of highway projects. 
 
The intricate complexity of the interplay between the deduced and induced themes has been 
conceptualised by the researchers, the results of this process, which is presented in Figure 2, 
as a cognitive map. Thise developed  cognitive map is an intricately interwoven 
representation of causality, between the core geotechnical themes, with the emergent 
organisational and human related themes arrayed as influences, whose node sizes were 
proportionally assigned, based on the frequency of references made during the coding 
process. The cognitive map depicts that cost overruns experienced in Niger Delta’s highway 
projects, is a function of the trickle-down effect of the human and organizational 
environment, as well as due to knowledge deficiencies in geotechnical risk management, 
which inherently escalate budgeted cost, over the lifespan of projects.  
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INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The cognitive map thus portrays the connectivity between the technical and psycho-social 
organisational and institutional issues, driving the high level of cost overruns experienced on 
highway project development in the Niger Delta. The core geotechnical themes thus interplay 
with bulbs of Oorganisational catalyst’, ‘Pressure Emitters’, ‘Psychological Traps’, ‘Skills 
Gaps’, ‘Dichotomies’ and ‘Unethical Facilitators’ of various scales (as ranked), entrenched 
within the wider macro social value system and geo-political climate of highway 
development in the region.  
 
Discussion 
The series of evidence from the analysis has thus provided context- specific qualitative 
explanations, about how the prevailing poor levels of geotechnical input constitute latent 
pathogens, which have triggered a chain reaction effect, right from the conceptual phase, and 
contributed to the increasing the levels of claims and variations, at the post-contract phase. 
This has consequently escalated cost and impacted on project delivery in the Niger Delta, 
leading to lengthy project delays and abandonments in highway projects. Poor geotechnical 
risk management by the highway agencies, has created a propensity for highway projects to 
run over budget, considering the financial risks inherent in the wetland geologic setting of the 
Niger Delta. The study findings have thus reinforced the generalisability of Love et al. (2012) 
latent pathogen theory, from the Australian context of building infrastructure, to highway 
projects in the Nigerian context. 
The findings from the study also reinforces to various extents, some of the existing theories 
on cost overrun. Typically, the study findings corroborate Gil and Lundriganm (2012; 2013) 
Relay Race versus Core and Periphery theories, in emphasizing the multiplicity of 
unforeseeable risks and often competing/clashing interest groups in public projects, as 
accounting for cost overruns. This is evident in the multiplicity of political and community 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta region. Political pressure at upper levelshelms of the 
hierarchy of power dictate to the highway agencies;, while community stakeholders exert 
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their influence at the grass root level, which exerts clashing socio-political pressure on the 
highway officials.  
However, irrespective of the case study findings upholding the validity of some of previous 
narratives, it has also shown that several others are not adequate to holistically explain the 
scenario of poor financial performance in highway project delivery in the developing world. 
Typically, in the Netherlands, Cantarelli et al. (2010:793) tested the theory of lock-in as “a 
form of psychological coping associated with the inability to withdraw from obligations made 
during the decision-making process”. From the findings of this research, the theory of lock-in 
reported in the Netherlands does not necessarily apply to the Nigerian setting. Additionally, 
tThe findings also do not uphold the theory of strategic misrepresentation, but rather. The 
findings show that in reality, no apparent form of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA), which should 
mandatorily form the basis of approval in choosing from competing alternatives, is even 
carried out. This finding is similar to the assertion of Morris (1990) who stated: “… Appraisal 
by the Government very often is devoid of meaning when the emphasis is only on the form of 
the project proposal rather than on its content- a tendency quite usual in bureaucracies”. 
Therefore, the elaborate theory of strategic misrepresentation by planners and highway 
officials posited in developed countries, is not evident in the data studied here, and 
fundamentally may not connote any significance in explaining cost overruns in the 
developing world. 
 
Another feature of the narrative offered in this study, in commonality with Morris (1990), is 
the preferential treatment of projects. As Morris (1990) concludes: “The politically expedient 
tendency to take up large numbers of projects and short fund them all, except those with the 
very highest priority, is perhaps the most important factor in delays. The Government's ad 
hoc approach in according high priority to certain sectors…while perhaps overcoming the 
problem in these sectors have compounded the problem elsewhere…” This narrative in the 
case of the Niger delta is evident in the: pPlanned versus adhoc procurement practices for 
major versus smaller community projects; pPolitically motivated selective project 
management practices; and uUnequal priority status in the post contract management of 
projects located in remote riverine areas relative to more visible upland projects. These 
dichotomous practices stand in sharp contrast to the assumptions of equality in the efforts and 
approach to managing approved public projects in the developed world.  
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The findings from this research has also validated the researchers’ preconceived notion, of 
the wide knowledge and skills gap between the developed and developing world, in the 
management of technical organisations. The study has revealed that at presently times, 
apparent knowledge deficiencies still exist, with respect to geotechnical risk management 
principles. This was evident from the responses of the agencies’ in-house design 
professionals, who exhibited very low levels of familiarity with the basic technical 
terminology of highway pavement designs and standards. These significant knowledge 
deficiencies demonstrated the worryingly low levels of awareness amongst in-house civil 
engineers, of the fundamental tools of their profession, or other internationally recognised 
best practice design standards. 
 
Conclusion 
The study findings provide strong empirical evidence on the current state of practice, as 
accounting for the poor financial performance of highway projects delivery in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria. In addition to the issues in geotechnical practice, an emergent theory from 
the data, is that project approval and execution for highway projects executed in the Niger 
Delta have no definite criteria, and are largely determined by the urgency induced from 
political and community quarters. The theory of: Pressure induced urgency, due to political 
and community emitters, which creates psychological traps and a repressive atmosphere for 
highway officials, leading to an adhoc, preferentially dichotomised and dictatorial type of 
project planning, with evidence of unethical practices in project execution and governance, 
seems to be an emergent strand of theoretical explanation to cost performance of highway 
projects, specific to the developing world. This is suspected as possibly the strongest 
theoretical explanation holding in the wider context of Nigeria, which complements the 
presence of geotechnical pathogens, triggered by a predominantly low level of technical-
know how. The combination of these technical and psycho-social vices, leads to a vicious 
cycle of short funding and delays, a theory earlier forwarded by Morris (1990) in the Indian 
setting. This advances the analytical generalisability of Morris (1990) study, in the 
developing world. The reality of the situation in highway project delivery in the developing 
world, as deduced from the findings of the study, show that cost overruns experienced in 
public projects, can be accounted for by a multiplicity of contextual variables, which have not 
been identified and explained by the theoretical discourse dominant in the developed world. 
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The study has thus shown that to better manage the risks inherent in the wetland conditions of 
the Niger Delta, the highway agencies need technical capacity in geotechnical risk 
management. To complement the specification of the financial risks, evident in the 
geotechnical shortcomings of Niger Delta’s highway projects, the following 
recommendations are suggested:  
o Highway agencies and relevant authorities in the Niger Delta, need to be enlightened 
about the general objective of geotechnical evaluation, and the need for geotechnical 
professionals to be employed in-house.  
 
o Cost projections made during the budgeting should reflect the likely variability along 
proposed highway routes. Emphasis should therefore be placed by the highway 
agencies, on getting geotechnical information via desk studies, carried out on time, as 
a basis of getting the project scope defined to the best possible degree. 
 
o There is a need to enforce the adoption of the TRRL (1993) design guide as required 
by the Federal Ministry of Works, by professionals in state and regional highway 
agencies, in the design of community road projects. 
 
o Ground Investigation Reports, with a further provision for Differing Site Condition 
clauses, should form an integral part of the standard contract documentation provided 
for tenderers. Furthermore, Contractor selection criteria should be objectively defined, 
including specific geotechnical assessment algorithms. 
 
Geotechnical aspects of highway delivery must therefore be strengthened, and the poor risk 
perception and attitude surrounding the procurement of highway projects, need to be 
changed, to give geotechnical concerns a higher priority status.  Also, implicit in the findings 
of this research, is the need to tackle the social vices plaguing the procurement system for 
highway infrastructure in the Niger Delta, which necessitates a major psycho-social culture 
shift. 
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Table 1: Qualitative Analysis Procedure  
 Qualitative Analysis Stages Description 
1. 
D
ed
u
c
ti
ve
 T
h
em
at
ic
 
A
n
al
ys
is
 
Development of Template  Projection of conceptual mind map in relation to 
logical flow of geotechnical themes linked to cost 
overruns in the literature; 
2. Initial Read through Air brush reading of the interview notes; 
3. Deductive A priori Coding 
 
Sorting and categorising interview responses into 
apriori themes  
4. Deductive Axial Coding Discovering subthemes and patterns around the 
parent themes 
5. 
In
d
u
ct
iv
e 
C
o
n
te
n
t 
A
n
al
ys
is
 
Second Read Through (Bottom-up reading) 
 
Reading the interview notes afresh from a new 
perspective  
6. Inductive Micro Coding Induce further micro themes related to cost overruns  
7. Inductive Cluster analysis Cluster analysis of induced micro themes into 
subthemes and emergent parent themes; 
8. Content analysis Further content analysis of induced themes; 
9.  Cognitive mapping Conceptualisation of Cognitive map of interrelated 
geotechnical and emergent cost overrun drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Cost Overrun Drivers inferred from the Deductive and Inductive Analysis  
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Theme       Sub-Theme            Cost Overrun Drivers 
Nomenclature of project  
Phases 
    Configuration 
    Pre-contract preparation 
Ill—Structured phase configuration 
Poor Pre-contract preparation 
Level of GI in preliminary  
project phase 
Lack of GI in conceptual costing 
lack of GI in Planning Phase 
 
Community restiveness pressure 
Lack of preliminary GI 
Community considerations 
Lack of geo-route-selection 
 
GI in designs Design preparation  
Process 
Mode of assessing  
heterogeneous ground conditions 
Non-Adherence to TRRL GI 
Ext Consultant GI 
DB contractors’ GI 
 
Adhoc design preparation 
Emergency designs 
Reactive Post contract GI 
Uniform standard designs 
Lack of Desk study 
Lack of detailed GI 
Based on preliminary reconnaissance 
Non-verification of GI 
 
GI in contractual Phase  Contract documentation 
Contractor selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No DSC Clauses 
Non-inclusion of GIR 
Non-engineering Form of contract 
Hand sketches designs   
Survey Plan layout contract documentation 
Verbal instructions 
Emergency Procurement 
No GI algorithm 
Non -Technical bids 
 
Organisational dynamics Flow of GI  
Clarity of professional roles 
Geotechnical Presence 
Contractual Porosity 
Poor organisational structure; 
Mis-matched qualifications and job description 
Lack of qualified technical manpower 
Porosity of contractual system 
Non-progressive GI    
Non-construction related professionals 
No Role Specific Professional delineation; 
Absence of in-house Geotechnical Personnel 
External Pressure Community pressure 
Political pressure 
    
 
Community Considerations 
Youth restiveness pressure 
Emergency procurement 
Contractors influence 
Political interference 
Unqualified contractors 
Lack of due process in contracts 
Unverified contractors’ claims 
Fear by professionals 
Unplanned budgeting 
Heightened security risk to contractors 
Psychologic Adversarial contractual stance 
De-motivation of professionals 
Risk perception 
 
Counter geotechnical relations; 
Oppressive Political influence 
Poor risk perception 
Unjustified expenditure for detailed GI; 
Skills and Knowledge Gaps  
 
 
Knowledge gaps in design 
Knowledge gaps in procurement  
 
 
Lack of clear understanding of geo-risk 
Ignorance of geotechnical best practices 
Lack of awareness of current design practices 
Non-discernible skills 
GI Dichotomies Major Vs Community Projects 
Upland Vs Riverine 
Preferential management of geotechnical risk in relation to project size and 
location;  
Planned vs Adhoc procurement practices for major vs community projects; 
Politically motivated selective project management practices; 
Lower priority status in post contract management of riverine projects 
Unethical Practices Unethical professional practices of 
consultants 
Unethical professional practices of 
contractors 
Unethical in-house verification  
Deliberate under-design of projects 
Replication of past GI reports 
Replication of similar designs 
Non-GI in DB designs   
Contractors Influence of design preparation 
Contractors Influence of contract award 
Stifled verification of post-contract GI 
In-house professionals serving in dual capacity as client and contractors 
representative 
Procurement Irregularities Hushed and Unrealistic Bidding 
Timelines  
Subjective Procurement 
Multiple Contract Re-Award 
 
Non-adherence to due contractual processes  
Non-publicising of call for bid 
Compressed timeline for tender submission 
informal hierarchical chain of contract subletting  
Multiple contract re-award 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Coded Clusters of Geotechnical and Emergent Themes  
 Deduced Themes 
 Induced Themes  
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Clusters Deduced Themes Induced Themes 
Organisational 
Catalyst  
 
Flow of GI  
Clarity of professional roles (CPR) 
Geotechnical Presence (GP) 
Contractual Porosity (CP) 
Poor organisational structure; 
Mis-matched qualifications and job description 
Lack of qualified technical manpower 
Porosity of contractual system 
Non-progressive GI    
non-construction related professionals 
No Role Specific Professional delineation; 
Absence of in-house Geotechnical Personnel 
Pressure Emitters   
 
 
Community Pressure (CMP) 
Political Pressure (PLP) 
Contractor Pressure (CNP) 
    
 
Community Considerations 
Youth restiveness pressure 
Emergency procurement 
Contractors influence 
Political interference 
Unqualified contractors 
Lack of due process in contracts 
Unverified contractor’s claims 
Fear by professionals 
Unplanned budgeting 
Heightened security risk to contractors 
Psychological Traps 
 
Adversarial Contractual Stance (ADC) 
De-motivation of Professionals (DMP)  
Risk Perception (RP) 
 
Counter geotechnical relations; 
Oppressive Political influence 
Poor risk perception 
Unjustified expenditure for detailed GI; 
Skills Gaps   
 
 
Knowledge Gaps in Design(KGD) 
Knowledge Gaps in Procurement(KGP) 
 
Lack of clear understanding of geo-risk 
Ignorance of geotechnical best practices 
Lack of awareness of current design practices 
Non-discernible skills 
 
Dichotomies 
 
 
Major Vs Community Projects (MjCm) 
Upland Vs Riverine(UpRv) 
Preferential management of geotechnical risk in relation 
to project size and location;  
Planned vs Adhoc procurement practices for major vs 
community projects; 
Politically motivated selective project management 
practices; 
Lower priority status in post contract management of 
riverine projects 
Unethical Facilitators 
 
 
Unethical professional practices of consultants 
(UPCL) 
Unethical professional practices of contractors 
(UPCR) 
Unethical verification Practices (UVP) 
Deliberate under-design of projects 
Replication of past GI reports 
Replication of similar designs 
Non-GI in DB designs   
Contractors Influence of design preparation 
Contractors Influence of contract award 
Stifled verification of post-contract GI 
In-house professionals serving in dual capacity as client 
and contractors representative 
Hushed and Unrealistic Bidding Timelines (HBT) 
 
Subjective Procurement (SP) 
 
Multiple Contract Re-Award (MCR) 
Non-adherence to due contractual processes  
Non-publicising of call for bid 
Compressed timeline for tender submission 
informal hierarchical chain of contract subletting  
Multiple contract re-award  
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Figure 1: Multiple Embedded Case Study Design 
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Figure 2: The Trickle-Down Effect of Human/Organisational Environment on Cost performance of Niger Delta’s Highway Projects 
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